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Abstract. A nested monitoring, diagnosis and reconfiguration (MDR) scheme 
is proposed for a Recursive Nested Behavior based Control structure (RNBC) 
constituting a generic system architecture for (semi-) autonomous mobile 
systems. Each behavior layer within the RNBC structure is associated with a 
MDR schema, which is responsible to ensure the dependability of every single 
layer. An online dependability measurement and diagnosis procedure is 
integrated into monitor and diagnosis blocks under consideration of 
performance and safety acceptability factors. The reconfiguration blocks within 
the MDR-scheme switch from components with unacceptable behavior to 
redundant components, which may have degraded performance but more robust 
and safe behavior. The MDR blocks at each layer are nested through unified 
interfaces in order to utilize the distributed modeling of system behavior and to 
facilitate the system design and implementation process. In a small case study 
the MDR scheme is demonstrated for an assistant wheelchair on the body 
velocity control and axis velocity control levels. Simulation results show the 
feasibility and effectiveness of the approach. 
Keywords: Dependability, autonomous mobile systems, monitoring, diagnosis, 
reconfiguration. 
1   Introduction 
In (semi-) autonomous mobile applications, the primary objective to use fault 
detection and diagnosis (FDD) and fault tolerant control (FTC) techniques is to 
increase system dependability. A unified FDD/FTC framework that adapt to behavior-
based architecture is required to assist system development. Some research projects 
[1][2] have developed layered fault tolerant control architecture for behavior-based 
mobile systems. However, finding novel control structures and design methods which 
are better applicable to engineering applications are still important research questions 
in the field of fault tolerance [3][4]. 
This work proposes a nested monitoring, diagnosis and reconfiguration scheme, 
named as MDR scheme, which is designed for the Recursive Nested Behavior-based 
Control (RNBC) structure [5]. Fault modeling and dependability concepts are adapted 
from [6] and [7]. In contrast to binary fault modeling the dependability concept is 
based on the behavior description of the system and its components. Dependability 
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properties are related to the deviation of the actual system behavior from the desired 
behavior and to the distance of critical system states from safety boundaries. The 
desired behavior can be described in the form of a reference output signal (reference 
mission), which may be generated by a reference model in response of a system input 
trajectory. The deviation of the actual system output from the reference output is 
monitored by the corresponding monitoring component. If a state-space reference 
model is available, the monitoring component may be realized in form of a state 
observer, which estimates the internal system states besides the next predicted output 
value. The monitoring component outputs the deviation signals (residuals) and the 
distance of critical states from their limits. In case of black box modeling all critical 
states must be visible as external signals. The external signals will be fed to a 
diagnosis component, which assesses the acceptability of the retrieved value (s. 
example below). Depending on the result the system is reconfigured using a 
reconfiguration component. Here a hierarchical monitoring, diagnosis and 
reconfiguration (MDR) scheme is proposed.   
2   Proposed MDR Concept 
The MDR scheme is integrated in the Recursive Nested-Behavior-Based Control 
(RNBC) structure consisting of a number of layers, which are recursively connected 
to each other [5]. Each layer in the RNBC structure hosts a number of components 
and corresponding dynamic behaviors. The behaviors can be uniformly described as 
signals, which flow between the layers, regardless their type of implementations (e.g. 
hardware or software). A single MDR block ensemble is locally associated with a 
single behavior layer and responsible to keep the deviation from the specified 
behavior in an acceptable level.  
Figure 1 shows two behavior layers of the RNBC structure, each of which 
containing a MDR scheme besides the functional components. Monitor, diagnosis and 
reconfiguration are the three components under consideration. The working principle 
of them will be explained in the following, using an exemplary modeling approach, 
i.e. all layers are described as linear time-invariant systems with time-continuous 
dynamics. 
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Fig. 1. Monitoring (M) – Diagnosis (D) – Reconfiguration (R) scheme integrated into the 
RNBC structure, exemplary shown for two behavior layers 
2.1   Monitor Block and Diagnosis Block 
The aim of the monitor block is to calculate the behavior deviation and the safety 
margin. Inputs for monitor Mi are: measured (ui, yi) of the ith layer, lower monitor 
status information Ii-1, and reconfiguration information Ri to indicate the status of the 
reconfiguration process and therefore to update the current reference model. A 
reference model, e.g. using a transfer function, which describes the nominal behavior 
of the considered layer, is required. The model is used to determine, for a given input, 
the reference output yref. The instantaneous deviation from the reference behavior is 
given by the residual (see also Fig. 2)  
  )()( ttt refP yyε 
.
                             (1) 
The residual is a basic ingredient for a normalized performance acceptability function  
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yielding a value range [0, 1] and indicating, how acceptable the system’s 
(component’s) behavior is in comparison to a maximum allowed output deviation EP.  
The definition of a safety acceptability function is also based on a behavioral 
description. Therefore, the concept a dynamic safety margin [6][8] has been adopted. 
In [8] safety boundaries for a state space model and a dynamic safety margin, which 
is the minimum distance from these boundaries, have been defined. In contrast to the 
original definition, here, the safety boundaries are related to the output signal, which  
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Fig. 2. Safety boundary and dynamic system trajectory.  
 
 
is equivalent in the case of having all internal critical dynamic states available as 
system outputs. 
For the given input u(t), there is a range [ymin, ymax] for the output y(t), where the 
system is considered to be in a safe condition. Now let  
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be the distance to the safety boundary (fig. 2) and  
 minmax2
1)( yytES 
            (4) 
the centre point of unsafe region at time t. Now, we can define the safety acceptability 
function 
 
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S            (5) 
with  1,0)( tAS  reflecting the system (component) safety level with respect to the 
maximum possible distance to the safety boundary )()( tEty S . 
The total acceptability is the weighted sum of all acceptability terms 
                     )()()( tAatAatA SSPPTOT  ,                   (6) 
which is a function of time and which reflects the coincidence of the actual system 
behavior with the specified behavior. According to [6], the integration of the 
acceptability values over the system’s mission trajectory leads to a unique overall 
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dependability measure. In this paper the instantaneous total acceptability function is 
used to decide, if the system yields an acceptance level A* or not. If A < A*, a system 
reconfiguration is enabled. 
2.3   Reconfiguration Block 
There are basically two questions, which must be answered before a system 
reconfiguration can be performed: 1. What configuration should the system have after 
the reconfiguration, 2. How can the system be brought to the new configuration 
(especially how does the system behave during the transient phase). 
The question, what new configuration shall be used can be answered as follows:  
Offline Design: Each behavior layer contains a nominal components and 
redundant components. Both are designed and tested offline. E.g. the nominal 
component is designed to deliver better performance while the redundant component 
is simple, well understood, and more robust against faults. Thus, for each component 
the (average) acceptability value for a set of predefined typical mission trajectories 
can be measured during system test. During operation of the system the best 
component (with the highest acceptability level) is selected. The component (or even 
a complete layer) under consideration is replaced by switching if the acceptability 
level drops under the level of the next best component. It is required that all possible 
combinations of components behave stable. The offline design method proposed is in 
contrast to online design methods, where the complete system (structure and 
parameters) is rebuild according to the instantaneous system constraints.  
The second question cannot be answered so easily, if the system can be switched 
forward and switched back between different (at least two) configuration, since the 
system may behave unstable even in the case, when the single configuration 
themselves are stable. Therefore, we assume here one single transient from an 
undependable configuration to a new dependable configuration.  
Online Switching: By default, all nominal components are supposed to be 
“normal”. The switching is enabled only after the switching condition (enable signal 
from M&D blocks active) is fulfilled. When the reconfiguration is enabled, the 
reconfiguration block checks the configuration Ri from lower layers and it checks 
then the stability of the redundant component in the loop with the lower layers. When 
the stability condition is fulfilled the switching process will start. If the redundant 
component is already in operation and detected to be failed, the whole system will be 
brought in a fail-safe condition. 
3   Application of the MDR Concept to an Intelligent Wheelchair 
System 
In this section, a small application scenario is proposed illustrating the concept of the 
MDR scheme. Therefore, the three lower levels of a human-assisting “intelligent” 
wheelchair control system are considered.  
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Figure 3 illustrates the MDR scheme for the velocity controller in a wheelchair 
system. Layer L1 consists of the axes-level velocity controller, the actuators and some 
data processing blocks. Layer L2 contains the body velocity controller. It gets the 
reference velocity   2, refx   from layer L3, compares it with the measured velocity 
  2, mx   from gyroscops and encoders and generates a control signal, which is the 
reference velocity   1, refx   for next layer. In this example, the primary PID 
(proportional-integral-derivative) controller is used as nominal controller. The 
secondary PI controller has lower performance but is simpler and more reliable.   
The secondary component is running in parallel with the nominal component (hot 
standby). Thus an initialization period and a long term transient phase can be avoided.   
 
 
Fig. 3. Application example: Three lower layers of an intelligent wheelchair system 
 
Parameters of PID/PI controllers and MDR are given in Table 1. These parameters 
comply with manufacturer and empirical data so that future implementation can be 
made based on them. 
Table 1.  System parameters for the body velocity control level. 
Components Parameters Value 
PID Controller  
 
Kp,trans,Ki,trans,Kd,trans 
Kp,rot,Ki,rot,Kd,rot 
1.33, 1.11, 0.37 
1.6, 1.33, 0.53  
PI Controller Kp,trans,Ki,trans 
Kp,rot,Ki,rot 
1.0, 0.5 
1.2, 0.6 
MDR ES, EP 
aS, aP 
A* 
[6, 6] T, [5, 5]T
0.5, 0.5 
0.75 
 
Simulation results of the developed MDR mechanism using the model above are 
shown in Figure 4 a, b. A fault in layer L2 is emulated by injecting a 1 second output 
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delay in the nominal PID controller. Figure 4.a shows the L2 behavior in 3 cases. The 
Blue line corresponds to the faultless case, the red line denotes the faulty case without 
MDR scheme and the green line denotes faulty case with MDR scheme. Figure 4.b 
shows the time-dependent acceptability level during a mission of 100 seconds. As the 
desired acceptability level is 0.75, the behavior switching happens at t = 0. It can be 
observed that the MDR mechanism has recovered the behavior to an acceptable level 
by switching to the redundant component upon failure detection.  
 
Fig. 4 a. L2 translative velocity behavior in faultless, faulty (no reconfiguration)  
and faulty (with reconfiguration) cases 
 
Fig. 4 b. L2 acceptability level in faultless, faulty (without MDR) and faulty (with MDR) cases 
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4   Conclusions and Future Research 
In this paper, a monitor-diagnosis-reconfiguration scheme for autonomous and semi-
autonomous systems is proposed. A Model-based monitoring and multiple-controllers 
online switching approach is realized and demonstrated within a realistic simulation 
example. Dynamic behavior acceptability improvement as reconfiguration goal is 
carried out. As a single behavior, the body velocity controller of a wheelchair system, 
was integrated together MDR within the proposed architecture. The simulation results 
show the feasibility of the proposed MDR scheme in terms of keeping the behavior of 
components and system layers within an acceptable performance and safety. In future 
research, the MDR scheme will be implemented into a real-time control system.  
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